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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant's Statement Of Jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Plaintiff waived and abandoned claims of breach

of warranty and product liability by failing to brief or argue
any basis for error in his Brief On Appeal, thereby conceding
summary judgment was properly granted by the trial court.
Whether a party has abandoned a claim on appeal is a
question of law for the reviewing court.

See Paxton v. State

Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in granting summary

judgment in a slip and fall case where the Plaintiff failed to
forward any admissible evidence that Defendant knew or should
have known of the existence of the dangerous condition by failing
to forward evidence regarding when the condition arose or how
long it existed prior to the accident.
A trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is
reviewed de novo by the appellate court.

Wineaar v. Froerer

Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statues and rules are set forth as
necessary in the text of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant accepts, for purposes of this appeal, the
-1-

Plaintiff's Statement Of The Case.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In the trial court the following facts were undisputed, and
"admitted for purposes of summary judgment" pursuant to Rule 4501(2)(a) of the Code of Judicial Administration having been
offered by the Defendant and unopposed by the Plaintiff, with the
exceptions noted below.
1.

See, R. 99-116; R. 117-133.

Defendant Waste Management of Utah, Inc. is in part,

[in] the business of leasing office trailers to construction
companies, which trailers are used on-site for offices and other
needs of construction companies.
2.

See, R. 61.

On July 6, 1990, TIC [Plaintiff's employer] leased from

Modulaire (a related company of Defendant) a double-wide mobile
field office, (citation omitted) See, R. 115.
3.

Defendant did not manufacture the subject trailer.

Instead it was manufactured by an unrelated company by the name
of Advanced Modular which is located in Bluffdale, Utah.
Advanced Modular is not a party to this lawsuit.

(See deposition

of Jerry Bryant, p. 7 ) .
4.

The terms and conditions outlined in the lease

agreement between Defendant and TIC required TIC to perform the
general maintenance associated with the trailer and to pay for
that maintenance.

(Bryant deposition, p. 10)(Exhibit A,

paragraph 12, Terms and Conditions).

Paragraph 12 of the Terms

and Conditions of the lease states as follows:
-2-

1212. Maintenance, damage, and destruction - except as
specifically otherwise provided in this paragraph,
LESSEE [TIC] SHALL AT LESSEE'S OWN EXPENSE AT ALL TIMES
KEEP THE EQUIPMENT IN GOOD AND EFFICIENT WORKING ORDER,
CONDITION AND REPAIR AND SHALL KEEP AND MAINTAIN
THEREON SUCH IDENTIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP AS LESSOR MAY
REQUIRE. Lessor will maintain and make any repairs
required from normal use to the roof, doors, windows,
light fixtures, heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning systems, except that LESSEE SHALL REPLACE
HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING FILTERS AND
BURNED OUT LAMPS AS REQUIRED AND PAY FOR ANY DAMAGE
CAUSED BY LESSEE. LESSEE SHALL BEAR THE FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING THE EQUIPMENT AGAINST THE
RISK OF DAMAGE, THEFT, OR DESTRUCTION OF THE LEASED
EQUIPMENT FROM EVERY CAUSE, AND SHALL MAKE ALL
REPLACEMENTS, REPAIRS, OR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTS OF
EQUIPMENT THEREON AT ITS EXPENSE, ALL OF WHICH SHALL
CONSTITUTE AN ACCESSION TO THE LEASED EQUIPMENT. IF
LESSEE DOES NOT ADEQUATELY REPAIR ANY DAMAGE FOR WHICH
LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE, LESSOR SHALL HAVE THE OPTION TO
PERFORM THE MAINTENANCE OR REPAIR AT LESSEE'S EXPENSE.
ANY DAMAGE CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF LESSOR WILL BE
REPAIRED AT THE EXPENSE OF LESSOR. LESSEE SHALL AT ITS
EXPENSE PROVIDE ADEQUATE JANITORIAL SERVICES TO KEEP
THE LEASE EQUIPMENT IN GOOD CONDITION, FAIR WEAR AND
TEAR ACCEPTED.
(See Exhibit A, paragraph 12) See, R. 115.
5.

Before the trailer was taken to the site where TIC used

it, it was inspected.
6.

(Bryan deposition, p. 11).

Once the trailer arrived on site it was again inspected

with a check list.

(Bryant deposition, p. 11)(See inspection

list, attached as Exhibit B, and incorporated herein by reference
as if set forth in full). See. R. 116.
7.

Part of the inspection includes a review of the

structural requirements and integrity of the trailer.

(Bryant

deposition, p. 12).
8.

This inspection did not reveal any defects relevant to
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the floor or the area where Plaintiff's alleged accident took
place.
9.

(Bryant deposition, p. 121).
Upon receipt of the trailer, TIC proceeded to install

walls to create individual office space.

(Danny R. Piva

deposition, p. 13).
10.

In September of 1991, Waste Management, at the request

of TIC, replaced some floor tiles near one of the doors to the
trailer because the tiles were coming loose.

(Danny R. Piva

deposition, p. 24; Linnae Jolley deposition, p. 9; Richard Young
deposition, pp. 38- 41).
11.

The entire time TIC had the trailer up until the time

of Plaintiff's alleged accident, none of the individuals who
worked in the trailer experienced any giveaway or weakness in the
floor or any other problems other than those related to the
tiling situation mentioned above.

(Janae Young deposition, p.

10; Danny Piva, pp. 29-30; Sheryl Piva deposition, p. 20; Linnae
Jolly, p. 19; Plaintiff's deposition, p. 36).
12.

Defendant did not receive any notice of a dangerous

condition with respect to the floor.

(Bryant deposition, pp. 14-

15) .
13.

In fact, the trailer was returned the day after the

alleged incident and there was no visible damage to the unit.
(Bryant deposition, p. 14).
14.

The area wherein Plaintiff's alleged accident took

place is not the same area where the minor tile repair work
-4-

occurred.
15.

(Piva deposition, p. 29; Young deposition, pp. 38-41).
During the pendency of the lease, Plaintiff's employer,

TIC, was in sole and exclusive possession and control of the
trailer in question apart from the minor repairs they hired
Defendant to perform.
16.

Just prior to Plaintiff's accident, TIC demobilized the

unit to prepare it for return to Defendant.

(Young deposition,

p. 10).
17.

This demobilization included removing the walls TIC had

installed to create office space.

(Young deposition, pp. 11, 12;

Janae Young deposition, p. 10; Piva deposition, pp. 18-19; Linnae
Jolley, p. 10, Sheryl Piva, p. 11, Plaintiff's deposition, pp.
31-33) .
18.

During this tear out process, no one at any time up

until the occurrence of Plaintiff's alleged accident noticed any
problems with the floor whatsoever.

(Plaintiff's deposition, pp.

21, 22, 31-32, 39; Sheryl Piva deposition, p. 20, Jolly
deposition p. 19, Janae Young deposition, p. 10, Danny Piva
deposition pp. 29-30; Richard Young deposition, pp. 14-15).
19.

In fact, the Plaintiff frequented the trailer during

his employment with TIC and had been in and out of the trailer
many times, averaging at least once a day and had not noticed any
problems with the floor.
20.

(Plaintiff's deposition pp. 21-22.

In fact, Plaintiff assisted in the demobilization and

had been in and out of the trailer multiple times on the date of
-5-

the accident, in the days prior to the date of the accident, and
during the demobilization.

(Young deposition, p. 10, Plaintiff's

deposition, p. 33).
In his Opposition To Defendant's Motion, pursuant to Rule
4-501(2)(b) Plaintiff disputed only paragraphs 12 and 13 of
Defendant's Statement Of Facts, stating at R. 118-119:
*

3.

*

*

Defendant asserts in paragraph 12 of its Statement of

Points and Authorities in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment that Defendant did not receive any notice of any
problems with respect to the floor in the area where Plaintiff's
accident took place.

The material fact is in dispute.

In

approximately March, 1992, TIC called Modulaire several times
concerning needed repairs to the floor in the front door area of
the trailer.

(See

deposition of Danny Ray Piva, p. 24-25) an

unknown person performed structural work in this area which
included new structural support members, new subfloor material
and new tile.(See deposition of Danny Ray Piva, p. 24-25;
deposition of Richard Young, p. 38-40).
•
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*

*

Defendant also asserts in paragraph 13 of its Statement

of Points and Authorities in support of its Motion For Summary
Judgment that the trailer was returned to the lessor the day
after the incident and there was no damage to the unit.

Yet,

witnesses present at the time of the incident testified under
-6-

oath during the taking of depositions that Plaintiff's leg fell
through the floor of the trailer and that there was a hole left
in the floor. (See deposition of Plaintiff, p. 39-41; Deposition
of Richard Young, p. 220-26.)
By operation of Rule 4-501(2)(b), of the Code Of Judicial
Administration the facts not specifically disputed above were
deemed admitted for purposes of Defendant's motion and were the
undisputed facts upon which the Trial Court based its ruling
granting Defendant summary judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff failed to argue or brief his claims of breach of
warranty or product liability.

As a result such claims are

waived and abandoned on appeal.
In the trial court, Plaintiff failed to forward admissible,
material evidence to support a prima facie case of negligence
against Defendant.

Specifically, Plaintiff failed to forward any

disputed evidence tending to show that the allegedly dangerous
condition causing his fall was actually known or should have been
known to Defendant.
Significantly, in the trial court Plaintiff failed to
forward any admissible evidence that the alleged dangerous
condition existed or could have been discovered when prior
repairs were undertaken.

It would be improper to allow a jury to

speculate that Defendant should have discovered the dangerous
condition simply because prior work was done on the floor of the
-7-

trailer.

There is simply no competent evidence that the alleged

dangerous condition existed and/or could have been discovered at
any time prior to Plaintiff's fall.

Moreover, no evidence was

presented showing that the condition existed for such a period of
time that Defendant, in the regular course of its reasonable
duties, could have corrected it.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE BREACH OF WARRANTY
AND PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF THE
CLAIMS OF ERROR ON APPEAL.
Utah C o u r t s r e c o g n i z e t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t ,
appellant

fails

waived."

P a x t o n v . S t a t e Farm Mutual I n s u r a n c e C o . , 809 P . 2 d

746,

to brief

an i s s u e on a p p e a l ,

751 (Utah App. 1 9 9 1 ) .

docketing

Similarly,

a r e deemed w a i v e d

R o s e l l i v . R i o Communities S e r v i c e S t a t i o n ,

P . 2 d 4 2 8 (N.M. 1 9 8 0 ) ; I n R e : P u l v e r ,

time i n i t s reply brief

787

8 7 1 P . 2 d 985 (N.M. A p p .

C a s e a u t h o r i t y a l s o h o l d s a p a r t y may n o t a r g u e

for the f i r s t

is

issues raised in a

statement but not b r i e f e d t h e r e a f t e r

and a b a n d o n e d .

1994 J . 1

the point

"where a n

matters

i n an a t t e m p t t o p l a c e t h e

1
See a l s o . Union O i l Co. of C a l i f , v . S t a t e , 677 P . 2 d 1256, 1259 (Alaska
1984) ( p o i n t s i n i t i a l l y r a i s e d f o r appeal but n o t b r i e f e d a r e c o n s i d e r e d
abandoned); Q u a l i t y F u r n i t u r e I n c . v . Hay, 61 Haw. 8 9 , 595 P . 2 d 1066, 1068 (1979)
( i s s u e s r a i s e d but n o t argued i n b r i e f a r e w a i v e d ) ; Northwest N a t i o n a l Gas Co.
v . G e o r g i a - P a c i f i c C o r p . , 53 Or. App. 8 9 , 630 P . 2 d 1326, 1329 ( a s s i g n e d e r r o r s
not b r i e f e d a r e deemed waived) r e v i e w d e n i e d , 291 Or. 8 9 3 , 642 P . 2 d 309 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ;
Kurpiuweit v . Northwestern Dev. Co. I n c . , 708 P.2d 3 9 , 46 (Wyo. 1985) ( e r r o r s n o t
a s s e r t e d a r e waived o r abandoned); Board of Education v . Kansas Dept. of Human
R e s o u r c e s , 856 P.2d 1343 (Kan. App. 1 9 9 3 ) ; Emery v . F e d e r a t e d Foods, I n c . , 863
P.2d 426 (Mont. 1 9 9 3 ) .
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waived issue back before the court.

Braun v. Alaska Commercial

Fishing and Agricultural Bank, 816 P.2d 140 (Alaska 1991).
In this matter Plaintiff originally brought three causes of
action against Defendant based on negligence, breach of the
warranty of habitability and product liability.

See, R. 2-5.

In

his brief on appeal, Plaintiff addresses only the trial court's
final judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff has abandoned his claims of breach of warranty and
product liability.

Summary Judgment may be affirmed as to those

two claims as a matter of law.
II.
WASTE MANAGEMENT IS NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR
DANGEROUS CONDITIONS IN THE LEASED PROPERTY OF WHICH IT
HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR REASONABLE TIME TO CURE
Plaintiff's first cause of action as alleged in his Amended
Complaint is based on negligence.

The over-arching proposition

of lessor/lessee liability is that a landlord is not the insurer
of the safety of its tenants.

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723,

727 (Utah 1985) .
Utah law recognizes that a lessor of premises cannot be held
liable for defects to the property unless the lessor knew or had
reason to know of the dangerous condition and had sufficient time
to remedy the condition after actual or constructive knowledge
exists.

Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89

(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah
1985); Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978); See also,
-9-

Moore v. Muntzel, 642 P.2d 957 (Kan. 1982).
A lessor's duty is defined as follows:
. . . a landlord is bound by the usual standard of
exercising ordinary prudence and care to see that the
premises he leases are reasonably safe and suitable for
intended uses, [and] under appropriate circumstances he
may be liable for injuries caused by any defects or
dangerous conditions which he created/ or of which he
was aware, and which he should reasonably foresee would
expose others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Stephenson. at 568 (citing Moore, at 958).
At the foundation of a lessor's duty to prevent injury
caused by a dangerous condition on premises is the lessor's
knowledge of the condition.2

However, knowledge is not

established by simply forwarding evidence that a person fell and
that the fall was caused by a dangerous condition in the
premises.

The threshold question to be resolved by a jury in all

such cases is; "when did the condition arise?"

The issue of

knowledge and any resulting duty is entirely dependent on the
answer to this initial inquiry.
Only when there is some material evidence regarding when the
condition arose can it be properly determined whether the
defendant actually knew or should have known a particular
condition existed.

After all, it would be sheer speculation to

state that an inspection of the premises would have provided
knowledge of a dangerous condition if there is no evidence that,
2
The knowledge of a dangerous condition triggers the Defendant's duty.
If there is no notice, either actual or constructive, no duty is triggered as a
matter of law. See Stephenson, at 568.
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in fact, the condition could have been discovered by an earlier
inspection.

Similarly, Plaintiff cannot establish that the

condition existed for such a period of time that it should have
been discovered and remedied by the Defendant if there is not
some evidence to suggest when the condition first arose.
A.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.
Plaintiff asserted in the trial court and has reasserted on

appeal that Defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous
condition existing in the floor at the time Plaintiff fell.

In

support of that claim Plaintiff argues:
By calling and requesting that Modulaire come and repair the
water damage to the floor of the trailer, TIC placed
Defendant on notice that a dangerous condition existed with
the floor area in front of the door. TIC responded to the
call and made some repairs. A factual question still exists
as to the nature and extent of these repairs.
Appellant's Brief p. 13; See, also, R. 122.
Plaintiff's appeal is based exclusively on the premise that
Defendant had actual knowledge of a defect in the floor prior to
Plaintiff's fall.

Plaintiff argues that when repairs were made

to the floor of the trailer in September of 1991, the Defendants
must have had notice of the existence of the dangerous condition
which caused Plaintiff's fall over six months later on April 28,
1992. See Brief of Appellant, p. 11, 13, 15.

Plaintiff argues

that such knowledge can be inferred by a jury as a matter of
"logic."

Id.

The fatal flaw in Plaintiff's argument is the lack of any
-11-

evidentiary connection between the evidence offered regarding the
nature of the previous repairs to the floor and evidence of the
condition of the floor at the time Plaintiff fell.

To properly

show some evidence that Defendant had actual knowledge that a
dangerous condition existed at the time prior repairs were made,
Plaintiff should have forwarded some admissible evidence tending
to show that the condition of the floor at the time of the
earlier repairs would have alerted a reasonable person that the
condition was presently dangerous or could become so during the
ensuing weeks or months.

Plaintiff offered no evidence that the

dangerous condition existed or was observable when the prior
repairs were made.
In fact, in the trial court, Plaintiff did not dispute the
statement of undisputed facts forwarded by Defendant which
demonstrated that Plaintiff did not even fall in the area where
repairs were previously made.3
Facts No. 14.

See, supra. State Of Relevant

Instead, for the first time on appeal, Plaintiff

argues that the jury should be able to "logically" conclude that
simply because some repairs were previously made to the floor,
that must have been where Plaintiff fell and, as a result, the
dangerous condition must have existed earlier and been known to
Defendant.

3

Plaintiff is bound by the undisputed fact that the his fall did not
even occur in the area where prior repairs were made. Because the statement of
fact was undisputed in the court below, the admission is binding for purposes of
summary judgment and on appeal, see 4-501(2)(b).

-12-

Contrary to Plaintiff's novel argument, the trial court
properly precluded the jury from speculating that the condition
that caused Plaintiff's fall "must have" existed or "had to be
known" to defendant merely because repairs were made earlier.
Moreover, the disputed evidence of the location of Plaintiff's
fall, even if properly raised below, does not itself, support the
necessary inference that Defendant must have had notice of the
dangerous condition when prior repairs were made.

In the case of

Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991), the court
ruled that evidence that a truck driver was driving improperly
forty-five minutes before an accident occurred was not admissible
as tending to establish that he was driving negligently at the
time of the accident.

The court ruled that the jury could not be

left to make such a speculative leap in logic. Id.
By analogy, in the present case, evidence that Defendant was
called to perform some repairs to the floor six months earlier is
not competent, admissible evidence tending to show that a
defective condition existed at the time of Plaintiff's fall or,
more significantly, that the condition was known to Defendant at
any time.

After all, as recognized in Kitchen, there are

"numerous possible explanations" as to the floor's dangerous
condition, "many of which would not involve the negligence" of
Defendant.

See Kitchen, at 459.

In fact, all of the relevant

witness in this matter testified that they had observed no prior
problems with the floor of the trailer prior to Plaintiff's fall.
-13-

See, supra.

Statement Of Relevant Facts No. 18.

Here, as in

Kitchen, "submitting the issue of negligence to the jury would
require the jury to engage in mere speculation as to whether (the
Defendant) was negligent."

Jd. at 460.

In sum, Plaintiff failed to present any competent,
admissible evidence to connect the fact of prior repairs to the
floor with knowledge of the condition of the floor at the time
Plaintiff fell.

To permit the jury to speculate that actual

knowledge existed based only on the fact that earlier repairs
occurred would have been improper under the law as stated by this
Court in Kitchen.

Plaintiff failed to forward admissible

evidence of negligence and, as a result there is no evidence to
establish that a duty toward Plaintiff ever arose in this case.
Summary judgment was properly entered and may be affirmed on
appeal•
B. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT ANY GENUINE EVIDENCE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION.
Plaintiff's failure to forward some admissible evidence
regarding when the condition arose is also fatal to any claim of
constructive notice.

Constructive notice is imposed on a

landlord when a dangerous condition exists and could have been
discovered by the landlord during its reasonable inspection of
the premises.

Gregory, 754 P.2d at 91.

It is also recognized

that the constructive notice of latent conditions cannot exist
where the lessee is in exclusive control of the premises. See
-14-

Moore v. Munsell, 642 P.2d 957, 958 (Kan. 1982).

Where the

landlord gives up all possessory interest and maintenance of the
premises is undertaken by the lessee, the landlord has no
realistic opportunity to inspect or repair and a duty to discover
cannot be imposed because it is realistically incapable of
performance.

See, Id; See also Beach v. University Of Utah, 726

P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1986) .
More importantly, however, is Plaintiff's failure to forward
any competent evidence regarding when the condition arose.
Absent some evidence of when the defect arose, it cannot be said
that the Defendant should have discovered it at some earlier
point it in its duty to inspect and/or maintain the trailer.
Without some evidentiary benchmark of time, it is improper to
allow a jury to speculate whether the condition could or should
have been discovered before the accident.

Therefore, Plaintiff

failed to establish that a duty arose as a matter of law.
Finally, no evidence was presented to the trial court upon
which a jury could base a finding regarding the length of time
the defective condition existed.

Absent some evidence of how

long the condition existed, or its cause, it is sheer conjecture
to surmise that Defendant had a reasonable period of time to
remedy the situation before the accident.

See Gregory, at 91.

Plaintiff's negligence claim fails for the simple reason
that no admissible evidence was presented regarding when the
alleged dangerous condition developed, for how long it existed or
-15-

that Defendant was or should have become aware of its existence
prior to the accident.

Summary judgment should be affirmed in

favor of Defendant.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to address the warranty or product
liability claims in his brief.

As a result claims of error as to

those causes of action are waived on appeal.
It has been shown that Plaintiff failed to forward any
admissible evidence regarding when the alleged dangerous
condition arose.

His failure to forward such evidence is fatal

to his claims of actual or constructive knowledge by Defendant.
Therefore, no duty arose on the part of Defendant.

Plaintiff's

negligence claim fails as a matter of law. Summary judgment, as
granted by the trial court, may be affirmed here on appeal.
DATED, November 4, 1996.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

SCOTTW.TCHRISTENSBN
BRADLEY fR. HELSTEN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Waste Management Of Utah, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

^ \ ^ day of October, 1996, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mr. James W. McConkie, Esq.
PARKER, MCKEOWN & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

G:\HELSTEN\WP\ERHART.APP
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Third Judical District

MAY 1 6 1996
liALi
By

Deputy Clerk

SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL ERHART,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF UTAH, INC.

Civil No. 940904775 PI
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come
before

the

court

on

Friday,

May

3,

1996,

plaintiff

being

represented by James R. McConkie, defendant being represented by
Scott W. Christensen, the court having reviewed the pleadings,
having

heard

oral

argument, and

being

fully

advised

in the

premises;
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

that

Plaintiff

presented no evidence upon which a jury could conclude that the
plaintiff received his injuries in the area where repairs had been
performed

some months prior to his accident.

Without other

evidence of what the defect consisted of, when it arose, or when it

0 0 01G 5

would reasonably have been discovered, summary judgment for the
defendant was proper.
DATED this

Ib

day of May, 1996.

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

JAMES W. McCONKIE
Attorney for Plaintiff
94-523D
ERHART\ORDER
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